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A Transpersonal Neuroanthropological Account
Charles D. Laughlin
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My brain and I are inseparable. I am who I am because my brain is what it is. Even so, I often think about 
my brain in terms different from those I use when thinking about myself. I think about my brain as that 
and about myself as me. I think about my brain as having neurons, but I think of me as having a memory. 
Still, I know that my memory is all about the neurons in my brain. Lately, I think about my brain in more 
intimate terms—as me. 
     —Churchland, 2013, p. 11
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The anthropology of the self has gained momentum recently and has produced a significant body of 
research relevant to interdisciplinary transpersonal studies. The notion of self has broadened from the 
narrow focus on cultural and linguistic labels for self-related terms, such as person, ego, identity, soul, 
and so forth, to a realization that the self is a vast system that mediates all the aspects of personality. 
This shift in emphasis has brought anthropological notions of the self into closer accord with what 
is known about how the brain mediates self-as-psyche. Numerous examples from the ethnography of 
the self are given, as are neuroscience research reports on the structure of the self. Engagement with 
the self is seen as an essentially transpersonal one, as self-awareness penetrates the mysteries of the 
transcendental self.
The anthropology of the self has gained momentum recently and has produced a significant body of research relevant to interdisciplinary 
transpersonal studies.1 But along with this upsurge 
of interest has come considerable confusion over just 
what constitutes the self. Contemporary anthropology 
offers very little in the way of a paradigmatic school of 
thought about self. Aside from remnants of the early 20th 
century impact of Freud on psychological anthropology, 
the discipline really has not developed a theoretically 
coherent approach to the self. Anthropology offers 
nothing in the way of a depth psychology of the self, 
nothing like Jungian archetypal psychology or Kohutian 
self psychology around which to organize research, to test 
hypotheses, and to explain patterns. With the possible 
exception of medical anthropology, anthropology is 
largely a natural science with very little input from either 
experimental research or clinical practice. However, 
what anthropology does offer is information about how 
non-Western peoples experience, conceptualize, and talk 
about the self. This ethnographic perspective perforce 
broadens understanding of the ways people have come 
to develop psychologically and to know themselves, 
more often than not in transpersonal terms. It is the 
aim of this paper to provide transpersonal researchers 
with an array of conceptual tools designed to enhance 
their understanding of self, especially as it relates to the 
advanced spiritual practices of non-Western societies.
Self: 
First Steps Toward a Definition
The word “self” is, of course, an English term, which has its own distinct history of use and meaning. 
Etymological dictionaries indicate that the word comes 
from the Old English self, seolf, sylf (“one’s own person, 
same”) and is related via Proto-Indo-European *selbaz 
to the Old Norse sjalfr, Old Frisian self, Dutch zelf, 
Old High German selb, and Gothic silba. The Old 
English form was emphatic, expressing “(I) myself,” 
“(he) himself,” and so forth, and implied reference to 
both a physical-spatial meaning (self and no-self) and 
a temporal meaning (same self through time; “I am the 
same person today as I was yesterday;” see Brockelman, 
1985, p. 81). Today one uses the word self to refer to a 
person’s essential being, that which distinguishes them 
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from others, and especially understood as the object of 
introspection or reflexive action. Implied in the term 
is the phenomenological “sense of self,” self as directly 
experienced as distinct from other. Moreover, one can 
signal the continuity of self through time by such phrases 
as “back to his old self again.” Conversely, one can signal 
that some change has occurred in a person by phrases 
like “he wasn’t himself today.” Hence, the connotation of 
self implies both physical and psychological boundaries, 
and both physical and mental continuity through time.
It is clear that from ancient times self has had 
an inherently ambiguous meaning—what I will call 
hereafter self-as-being and self-as-psyche. One may use 
self to label the fact that one’s entire being, including 
one’s body, one’s physical existence, is present, is 
bounded, is distinct from the other and has remained 
so through some duration of time. One may also use self 
to refer to the psyche and its mental faculties, including 
intentionality, personhood, ego, persona, feelings, and 
unconscious processes—perhaps also soul—and so 
forth, which are distinct from the mental faculties of 
the other, and that have remained the same “mind” 
through some considerable duration of time. The degree 
of distinction between self-as-being and self-as-psyche 
depends upon the extent to which one is enculturated 
(the process by which a baby grows up to be inculcated 
with his or her society’s skills, values, attitudes, and 
knowledge) to believe that there exists a mind-body 
dualism—that is, the belief that mind and body are 
two different substances, levels, metaphysical planes, 
domains, and so forth. If I say “I went there myself,” I 
will usually mean that my entire physical being moved 
there, that I was there in both body and mind. However, 
an Australian Aborigine might say something in her 
language that is similar to “I went there myself,” but 
actually mean that she traveled there in her dream state. 
For the Australian Aborigine, the distinction between 
self-as-being and self-as-psyche is not as extreme as it is 
for most Westerners, yet she would certainly know that 
she had left her body behind while she traveled as her 
spirit-self, her “soul.” Indeed, she may well report that 
she had met others during her dream journey who had 
likewise left their physical forms behind, if they still had 
physical forms—were not perhaps ghosts of departed 
relatives (see Laughlin, 2011). The distinction between 
self-as-being and self-as-psyche is sometimes subtle and 
often muddled in anthropological writings, one reason 
being that although the self-concept (self-construal, 
self-representation) is a cultural universal (i.e., people 
everywhere make the distinction between self and non-
self or other), how different peoples understand the 
self can vary enormously (Spiro, 1993). It is the task of 
ethnology (i.e., the scientific study of culture) to unpack 
differences and similarities among the ways people come 
to know what they know about themselves, their society, 
and their world. The thing to keep in mind is that 
anthropologists of whatever age have almost always been 
concerned with self-as-psyche, not self-as-being.
Anthropology of the Self
It is commonplace in anthropology to maintain that the Western (i.e., Euro-American-Aussie) cultural 
concept of the self is somewhat different, perhaps even 
aberrant, when compared with the majority of non-
Western peoples (Geertz, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Westerners do tend to cognize the self as an 
independent, distinct, separate, and autonomous 
individual, while most traditional peoples conceive of 
themselves as interdependent, as social actors whose 
identities derive from their position in a social network—
as cogs in the social wheel. It is also the case that most 
people in all societies identify themselves with their 
culturally defined self-concept (social-self or ego), rather 
than the self as it really is (see Spiro, 1993). However, the 
Western vs. non-Western conception of the self is not a 
simple black and white contrast, for there are people in 
each type of society that may be found to exhibit the 
style of self-construal of the other (Hollan, 1992; Mpofu, 
1994). Thus any scientific definition of the self must be 
amenable to a range of sociocultural variation broader 
than is normally modeled in Western psychology.
To one extent or another, ethnology has been 
interested in the social and cultural aspects of the self 
since the discipline’s inception as a science in the mid-
19th century. The reason for this is the obvious ubiquity 
of ethnopsychologies (local theories of mind) among 
the planet’s peoples. As Paul Heelas (1981a) noted: 
“Indigenous psychologies are in fact necessary if three 
interrelated functions are to be fulfilled: sustaining 
the ‘inner’ self, sustaining the self with respect to the 
sociocultural, and enabling sociocultural institutions 
to operate” (p. 13). In other words, human beings 
everywhere are curious about themselves and develop 
personal knowledge both through direct experience 
and through the internalization of the society’s norms, 
self-concepts, and categories. The principal interest of 
the anthropology of the self is in understanding how 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 102 Laughlin
the developing individual constructs his or her identity 
within the context of physical and social environment. 
One fundamental impact of a cross-cultural view is 
that the definition of the self as used by psychology and 
interdisciplinary transpersonalists should conform to 
how it may be applied in other non-Western societies. 
In other words, the definition one uses should reflect 
the fact that all societies have words for and concepts of 
the self, but that how the concept is instantiated in each 
culture may vary, as it will among individuals making 
up the group. 
Factors in the Cross-Cultural Understanding 
of the Self
 There are other factors that become evident in 
the cross-cultural literature, and I will discuss each of 
them in turn, giving examples from the ethnographic 
literature and adding some relevant literature in case the 
reader wishes to follow-up. Sensitivity to these factors will 
allow interdisciplinary transpersonalists to better utilize 
the ethnographic literature in their formulations. For 
instance, knowing that so-called lucid dreaming is quite 
common in many societies should temper discussions of 
lucid dreaming as an unusual experience among Western 
subjects and how such subjects conceive of the dream-
self (Laughlin, 2011).
Self-as-being versus self-as-psyche. Virtually 
all anthropological treatments pertain to the self-as-
psyche, as opposed to the self-as-being, as described 
above. Perhaps as many as 95% or more of uses of the 
term in the anthropological literature are concerned with 
the psychological dimensions of personhood, identity, 
role, status, and so on, rather than the greater existential 
sense of “being in the world” (i.e., existence, Heideggerian 
dasein; Heiddeger (1953/1996). Keeping this distinction 
in mind may help in processing ethnographic data in 
the context of interdisciplinary transpersonal studies 
wherein writers often imply self-as-being in their 
research methods and analyses. Indeed, transpersonal 
research often requires a developmental shift from a self-
awareness locked into a culturally defined social identity 
to a transcendent awareness of being (e.g., Barušs, 2003).
The people living on Saburl Island near New 
Guinea make a distinction typical of traditional peoples, 
and to some extent modern technocratic nations as 
well—that being the difference between someone who is 
physically human and someone who is morally human, 
the latter being defined as an individual who knows the 
“rules of sociality” (Battaglia, 1990, p. 55). The process by 
which one becomes a moral human is a trick of memory 
in which the disparate experiences one has and stories one 
hears suddenly coagulate into one understanding. The 
stories become one story, and one finds grounding for 
one’s social self. By inculcating the lessons of experience 
and stories, one realizes a self that is fully Saberl—that 
being, one who is capable of participating in a flowing, 
meaningful, and unobstructed social discourse.
Self-as-experienced and self-as-reported. A 
close reading of the ethnographic literature makes one 
aware of a distinction that is often poorly operationalized. 
That is the distinction between self-as-experienced 
and self-as-reported, or to put it in other words, how I 
experience myself from moment to moment and how I 
talk about myself in public (Hallowell, 1955; Hollan, 
1992). The ethnographic literature often seems to equate 
self with self-concept, self-knowledge, and personhood—
the self as described in language (e.g., Battaglia, 1995; 
Goddard, 1996). Limiting research to the ways that 
people talk about themselves and others: (1) slants the data 
in favor of the typical constructivist bias, for people are 
influenced by rules of appropriate linguistic production 
and etiquette and may be reporting in terms of cultural 
models as opposed to personal phenomenology (Throop, 
2000), and (2) leads to ethnographers ignoring or down-
playing the vast depths of the transcendental self—the 
psyche each individual is culturally conditioned to 
model. Thus, ethnographic research that is limited to 
recording how people customarily talk about themselves 
is often psychodynamically shallow and of limited 
importance to transpersonal studies. Moreover, because 
different non-Western peoples talk about the self, 
personhood, social identity, and consciousness in myriad 
different ways, it is difficult to compare cognitions across 
cultures, or to isolate those aspects of the transcendental 
self that may be universal to the species (Erchak, 1992). 
It should be remembered that language hides as much or 
more than it reveals about experience (see Weiner, 2001) 
and may easily gloss over non-linguistic factors involved 
in self-awareness and self-understanding, which may 
be more fluid, universal, and developmental than self-
reports may describe.
Another way to view this issue clearly is to make 
a distinction between public and private self (see Heelas, 
1981b, p. 43). People often express that there is more 
to themselves than others know. In fact, they often say 
“nobody knows me.” That means that they are not getting 
feedback about themselves that matches what they know 
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about themselves. Again, anthropology has most often 
focused upon the public self: the social identity, persona, 
public ego, and so forth.
The embodiment of self. More modern 
anthropological conceptions of the self have insisted 
upon its embodiment. Following on from Hallowell’s 
(1955) pioneering work, Thomas Csordas (1994) argued 
that the only perspective that fits cross-cultural findings 
is an experiential-phenomenological one that recognizes 
the self as an amalgamation of “prereflective bodily 
experience, culturally constituted world or milieu, and 
situational specificity or habitus” (p. 5). The various 
somatic processes orient the being to the world—
processes mediating perception and action (“practice”)—
and exist prior to self-reflection and cultural conditioning 
(see Powers, 2005). The fundamental function of the 
self is orientational; that is, the essential and embodied 
processes of the self operate to orient the being toward 
objects and events in the world, toward the social 
other, and toward oneself as the center of an existential 
situation. In reflexively objectifying the self, one creates 
the fiction of personhood, an identity influenced by 
culture and projected outwards upon society.
I do not mean to imply that all non-Western 
societies exhibit the extreme mind-body dualism typical 
of technocratic societies. Far from it, for many cultures 
see the self as a physical entity. For instance, while the 
Muinane people of Columbia speak of themselves in 
much the egoistic terms Westerners do, their ontological 
assumptions about the self are as a physical substance, 
or, to put it in other words, they do not posit a clear 
distinction between thought and act, both being part 
of the same physical process (Londoño-Sulkin, 2000). 
Muinane are enculturated to pursue a way of life they 
consider “cool,” and remaining cool requires cool 
thoughts—like, loving their kinsmen, avoiding improper 
intentions, showing respect for others, working hard, 
and so forth. Evil is produced by people and other beings 
that are “hot,” meaning egotistical, self-serving, angry, 
and morally ignorant. A hot person is transformed into 
a cool one by the ritual manipulation of the substances 
causing such anti-social and dangerous tendencies.
Nor should I leave the reader with the 
misconception that just because a people conceive of 
the self as a substance, that the substance fits a Western 
category of physical “matter.” Indeed, few peoples are 
materialistic in that way. One of the most common 
conceptions of self and body is that people, just like all 
other things in the world, are essentially made up of an 
élan vital, or vital force. The Navajo speak of that force 
in terms of “wind” (McNeley, 1981). The Holy Wind 
is a single force that pervades everything in the world. 
Hence, everything (including people) is implicated in 
everything else. This is a common view among African 
peoples who conceive of this force or energy in the 
person as interpenetrating with that of others, and with 
all things (Horton, 1983; Morris, 1994). The African 
ontology is quite similar to that among Pacific peoples 
who hold to various conceptions of “mana” as a living, 
vital force in and between persons (Keesing, 1984).
Egoistic versus social self. Personhood never 
develops in a social vacuum. One develops a self-concept 
in relation to others among whom one is raised. All people 
everywhere experience themselves as both individual and 
social actor (Mageo, 1995, 1998). But in many societies, 
the sense of self develops so thoroughly bound to family 
and community relations that people have a difficult 
time considering the self apart from society (as in the 
case of the Muinane above). Among the Cashinahua of 
Western Amazonia, people make a distinction between 
a normal person who craves interaction with his kin and 
a being they call a yuxin who has no fixed place in the 
world (Lagrou, 2000, p. 159). 
Moreover, all normal (i.e., non-psychopathic) 
individuals acknowledge the personhood of the other in 
every encounter. As George Murdock (1945) noted, every 
culture on the planet demarcates encounters with the 
other with ritual hellos and goodbyes (see also Gregor, 
1977, for a case in point among the Mehinaku of Brazil). 
Moreover, the vast majority of societies encourage the 
developing person to conceive of themselves in socially 
pragmatic ways (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2010; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Whom I conceive myself to 
be as a person, as an identity, as a self-image, persona or 
ego, is coterminous with my social status, my role(s) in 
the social fabric, and my position in the family, lineage, 
and clan, as well as any ritual exchange network with 
which I am involved. Gender is always a factor, of course. 
As Gerald Erchak (1992, pp. 59-61) noted, all human 
societies exaggerate gender differences. I might add that 
gender categories are often some of the most rigidly held 
in defining social identity. At the moment, the cultures 
of the technocratic world are undergoing a profound gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender (GLBT) revolution, which 
reveals just how rigid or flexible traditional gender roles 
can be. 
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The role I play in the political and economic 
structure of the group is entirely entangled with my 
conception of social context. While knowing that I am 
distinct as an entity, a person, I nonetheless define myself 
in my relation to others. In a very real sense, people are 
symbols to one another, and even symbols to oneself 
(Stromberg, 1985). When people encounter one another 
through the mediation of social categories (male vs. 
female, higher status vs. lower status, authority vs. peer 
group member, etc.), they are conditioned to alter how 
they present in the encounter. They are often performing 
who they are on a socially appropriate stage (Battaglia, 
1990, 1995). This cross-culturally common situation 
involves self-construal: internalizing during development 
the historical narrative, social statuses and roles, and 
the system of reciprocal obligations and responsibilities 
in which the individual is embedded, as well as the 
projection of social categories and expectations upon 
the other. These relations and reciprocal obligations may 
extend into cosmological domains, including backwards 
into my culture’s cosmogony (Mageo, 2001a, pp. 4-6) 
and into my present or past interactions with other-than-
human persons, as Hallowell (1955, 2010) liked to call 
spiritual beings (i.e., with ancestors, totemic spirits, gods, 
etc.; Block & Parry, 1982).
Martin Sökefeld (1999) made the point that 
modern anthropology recognizes that traditional 
societies are made up of a plurality of selves. Culture does 
influence the development of self-identity, but this does 
not mean that identities are stamped out by some kind 
of cultural cookie-cutter. Indeed, as he illustrated among 
the people living in the town of Gilgit in Northern 
Pakistan, identities quite often come into conflict. 
Individuals under the stress of social involvement may 
be forced to embrace a number of identities, and some of 
these identities may even conflict with each other.
Sameness and duration of self. A person’s self-
identity is almost always seen as an enduring process 
(Sökefeld, 1999). Even though the self may change 
through time—may grow, develop, evolve, mature, 
transcend the limits of social categories, and eventually 
die—there is the sense that I remain the same enduring 
object or process over time. For instance, anthropologists 
will speak of “life-history” durations of selfhood (e.g., 
Cole & Knowles, 2001; Thomas, 2005), and again, the 
duration of the self may continue on after death into 
ancestorhood (Royce, 2011). Those societies that believe 
the person is reincarnated may consider aspects of the 
self to pre-date conception and to continue lifetime after 
lifetime, if only as a bundle of karma (Block & Parry, 
1982).
In addition, the self not only has agency, it is the 
product of agency (Bourdieu, 1977; Brockelman, 1985; 
Sökefeld, 1999). In either case, the human self is marked 
by the capacity to bind time in both its development 
and in its intentions (Piaget, 1980). The self takes time 
to develop because it is the product of the interaction 
between the individual and the social and physical 
world, and the self may project its intentions into the 
distant future by way of planned actions that may take 
time to come to fruition. Hence, it is obvious that the 
role of memory in construing a social self or self-identity 
is fundamental to the process (Ben-Āmôs & Weissberg, 
1999; Mageo, 2001b, p. 15). A clear example of this factor 
may be found in Marianne George’s (1988) description of 
the importance of mounting and participation in rituals 
that transform the status of people of power among 
the Barok living on the island of New Ireland in Papua 
New Guinea. For Barok “big men,” certain major rituals 
not only mark the transformation of personal power, 
the years-long effort in mounting the ritual actually 
produces the transformation. This is apparently typical 
of Melanesian rituals of exchange in that they operate 
to change egoistic motivations into social regard (Gow, 
2000, p. 48).
The lifetime process of self-development may 
be socially punctuated by phases of transformation 
demarked by ritual, so-called rites of passage (Turner, 
1967, 1969; van Gennep, 1909/1960). For example, 
transformation in a person’s social status and power 
is often accomplished during such rituals (Burns & 
Laughlin, 1979). Ritual transformations typically result 
in both public and self-referential changes in one’s 
personhood. Male members of the Sambia tribe of the 
New Guinea highlands are forced through a series of 
brutal initiations, which, according to Gilbert Herdt 
(1982), transform each male’s identity from a dependent, 
female dominated sense of self in early childhood to that 
of a fierce warrior who represses his feminine side and 
defines himself in opposition to women so that he may 
effectively fight wars and copulate with captured and 
presumably hostile women.
Self and emotion. The self includes emotional 
as well as perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral attributes 
(Laughlin & Throop, 1999; Markus & Kitayama 2003; 
Overing & Passes, 2002b; Throop 2000). Indeed, 
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the control of emotion may be fundamental to how 
individuals are conditioned to present themselves in 
social situations. All too often anthropologists treat 
the building of self-construal as though it is strictly a 
cognitive-linguistic process. However, the self-as-psyche 
includes not only what I think and imagine about myself 
and the other, but also what I feel about myself and the 
other. C. G. Jung (1955, p. 138 [CW 18 para. 318]; 
1978, pp. 329-330 (CW 5 para. 507]) taught that one 
comes to know oneself by watching the emotionally-
laden attributes one shares with, and that one projects 
upon, other people. Emotions are contagious, as is 
inevitable in a social species; people tend to be drawn 
into the emotional tone of the group. Moreover, people 
tend to confound their own unconscious attributes with 
the perceived attributes of the other. This quite natural 
process of projection plays a significant role in the 
construction of a social self.
The role of emotion is fundamental to one’s 
sense of self in many societies. Brian P. Farley (1998) 
has shown the role of anxiety in constructing a sense of 
self among the Nahuatl-speaking people living in the 
village of San Bartolomé Guahuixmatlac in the state of 
Tlaxcala, Mexico:
I argue that the sociocentric-oriented self as 
developed in San Bartolomé experiences deep 
emotional conflicts and strong resentment toward 
others. Individuals subordinate their own interests to 
collective purposes because they experience anxiety 
in association with their own drives and desires and 
fear retaliation from either social contemporaries or 
supernatural beings. (p. 272) 
Indeed, for a person to exhibit willfulness in pursuit of 
their own desires may invite systematic and negative 
sanctions. Among Malayan peoples, there is pressure to 
deport oneself so as to not appear foolish or contrary, 
and thus avoid feeling shame (Goddard, 1996). In 
virtually all societies, the socially appropriate sense 
of self involves controlling the expression of negative 
feelings, especially anger (Overing & Passes, 2002a, p. 
22). See: Gaffin (1995) for the Faeroe Islanders of the 
North Atlantic who recognize a type of person called a 
rukkur, “an easily angered fool;” Briggs (1970) for the 
Utku Inuit of the arctic for whom reason is valued above 
all emotions, and those who show anger are ostracized; 
and Harris (1978) for the Taita people of Kenya who, 
recognizing the destructive effects of anger, have rituals 
for purifying negative emotions. Indeed, so prevalent is 
this stricture on showing negative emotions that it has 
led Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) to 
suggest there is a universal bias in cultural conditioning 
toward positive self-regard.
Self-system. There has been a gradual reali-
zation in anthropology that the self is less an entity 
than it is a complex psycho-physical system, which may 
trend towards unity or fragmentation (e.g., Csordas, 
1994, p. 276), depending on personal, developmental, 
social, and environmental pressures, especially during 
a person’s formative years (Mageo, 1995, 1998, 2002b). 
The self-system (as Jeannette Mageo aptly called it) is 
organic and therefore it develops, grows, and changes 
over time. When speaking of the self in this way—from 
the phenomenological point of view the only sensible 
perspective—one is talking about arguably the most 
complex system in the known universe. As with any 
organic system, there are developmental factors that 
are all-important in understanding how the system 
comes to be structured and operate in its adult form 
(Bourguignon, 1989; Mageo, 1995). 
Self-body dualism. Cross-cultural research has 
shown that virtually all societies on the planet conceive 
of the self and the body to be separable to some extent. 
In a research project some of my students and I carried 
out some years ago, we asked some questions about 
mind-body relations of a standard holographic sample 
of societies from around the world (see full report at 
Laughlin, n.d.). We found that although many societies 
evidence a more unitary view of mind-body relations 
than Westerners do, virtually all societies have some 
notion of mind being distinct from body, if nothing 
more than they experience leaving their body and 
traveling around in their dreams. In other words, mind-
body dualism ranges from minimal to extreme, but 
is nonetheless a cultural universal. The importance of 
this finding for explanations of notions of immortality 
cannot be overemphasized. The phenomenological gap 
suggests to a person’s mind that their consciousness 
is somehow separate from their corporeal nature, and 
that the mind, or some part of the mind, may continue 
to exist, in some sense, “long after the frail corporeal 
envelope which lodged it for a time has moldered in the 
dust” (Frazer, 1933/1966, p. 3).
Multi-state self. One of the most important 
findings in ethnology for transpersonal studies is that 
for most traditional societies, people develop their 
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identity in part from information they derive while 
in alternative states of consciousness (ASCs), that is, 
experiences had while dreaming, having visions and 
mystical states, on drug trips, and participating in rituals 
(Bourguignon, 1973; Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977; 
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin, McManus, & d’Aquili 1990; 
Winkelman, 2010). The distinction between these kinds 
of societies and those of the Western world (usually 
modern technocratic societies), where ASCs are either 
not encountered or ignored in identity formation, is 
critical. For this reason, two types of culture are defined: 
monophasic cultures in which knowledge of self and world 
tends to be derived from what Westerners think of as 
“normal waking” experiences, and polyphasic cultures 
in which knowledge of self and world is derived from 
multiple states of consciousness (see Laughlin et al., 
1990). The latter type characterizes the vast majority of 
the planet’s societies.
Certain states of consciousness are more easily 
influenced by normally unconscious processes than 
others. This is particularly true of dream life and is 
why dream work is vitally important in many types of 
psychotherapy and in advanced Jungian individuation 
(Hillman, 1987). Hence it follows that the construal of 
self among polyphasic peoples may be quite different—
and some have argued potentially more productive of 
advanced, holistic self-development—than that among, 
say, modern Westerners whose protean ego development 
may thwart advanced self-realization. This factor is 
evident in the extent of control the dream ego may 
exercise in the dream life. For most Westerners and 
monophasic peoples, generally, dreams just kind of 
happen, usually without any exercise of will on the part 
of the ego. Among many polyphasic societies, however, 
people routinely travel at will in their dreams. This is a 
particularly important skill learned by certain shamans 
who may seek socially vital information and healing 
power in the dream world (Laughlin, 2011).
Transcendental versus cognized self. Peoples 
vary as to the extent to which they distinguish between 
culturally influenced self-construal and the recognition 
of the self as a transcendental object, system, or field 
(Jung, 1968b, p. 181 [CW 12  para. 247]). Some cultures 
hold that the culturally inculcated empirical ego is 
merely a reflection of the true, mysterious and mystical 
self that is either ultimately unknowable, or knowable 
by only a few advanced individuals (shamans, seers, 
mystics, etc.; see Winkelman, 2010). Ethnographies 
will sometimes confound the term self with other terms 
such as identity, personhood, personality, ego, being, 
subjectivity, ethnicity, and self-construal (Erchak, 1992, 
p. 8). As I have said, what most anthropologists are 
referring to is the way a people talk about themselves 
relative to the other (either to other persons or other 
groups), to their social position and status, or to their 
role with respect to their cosmology. There are some 
societies in which the development of the self is thought 
to pass through multiple stages, usually involving a 
person’s comprehension of and participation in the 
society’s spiritual life (e.g., see Jorgensen, 1980, for the 
Telefolmin, and Barth, 1975, for the Baktaman, both of 
New Guinea).
Transpersonal self-construal. Mara, DeCicco, 
& Stroink (2010) have suggested the term metapersonal 
self-construal for societies recognizing transpersonal 
development. Metapersonal self-construal “is defined 
as a sense of one’s identity that extends beyond the 
individual or personal to encompass wider aspects of 
humankind, life, psyche, or the cosmos” (DeCicco & 
Stroink, 2007, p. 84). Again: 
The focus of an individual with this self-construal 
moves beyond personal and relational views of the 
self to a more universal view. In other words, the 
metapersonal self-construal is not simply defined by 
personal attributes or social relations, but instead 
defines the self as connected to all things. The 
metapersonal has a universal focus that includes all 
life and nature into the concept of the self. (Mara et 
al., pp. 1-2).
The ethnographic literature is rife with cultures that 
not only recognize a metapersonal dimension to the 
self, but actively encourage self-realization and peak 
experiences of self in relation to the world (LaHood, 
2007; Laughlin, 1989, 1994a, 1994b, 2001; Laughlin, 
McManus, & Shearer, 1993). In many of these cases, the 
distinction between self-as-being and self-as-psyche not 
only becomes blurred, it may well be culturally irrelevant 
(Bateson, 1980).
Broadening the Definition of the Self
In summary, modern ethnology tends to 
encounter local conceptions of the self as embodied, 
as a system: (1) that perceptually orients the individual 
toward both the social and physical world and the inner 
being, and (2) that guides intentional action. The self 
is not an entity—not the product of a constructivist 
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cookie-cutter mechanism—but does develop a model of 
itself through adaptive development and self-reflection. 
The product is a self-concept or identity that may be 
pluralistic and even protean, that is inextricably linked 
to emotion, and that is strongly influenced by cultural 
categories (such as age, sex, status, role, spirit, soul, 
morality, etc.). Cultures generally recognize that the self 
is plastic and that it develops with age, sometimes passing 
through culturally recognized maturational phases that 
may be demarked or facilitated by rituals. Some societies 
also recognize higher, transpersonal dimensions of self-
development, which perhaps only a few individuals in 
the group ever attain.
Self from a Neuroanthropological Standpoint
Anthropological and neuropsychological 
approaches are not only compatible, it is clear that they 
are mutually supportive and paint similar pictures of 
the self (see Kitayama & Park, 2010). This is especially 
true when more introspective or experiential methods 
are used in ethnology. This is not surprising, for the 
structure(s) of the self are the neurophysiological 
networks that mediate awareness, personality, emotion, 
cognition, imagery, point of view, temporal perspective, 
planning, social identity, and all the other attributes 
of the self as described by ethnographers. Thus, a 
neuroanthropological perspective on the self is possibly 
the most powerful window one has on human nature. So 
let me finally define self in a way that is amenable to both 
neuroscience and anthropology.
 From the neuroanthropological standpoint, 
the self is comprised of those neurophysiological 
structures that mediate the psyche, including those 
specialized networks that produce self-reflection. Self 
is a distributed system of neural networks, some of 
which are more common to experience than others. 
Because it is made up of living cells, the self-system is 
organic and dynamic, and changes its organization 
from moment to moment depending upon the focus of 
consciousness. The biological function of the self is to 
orient mental functions to those aspects of the world 
that are of adaptive significance, including the physical 
environment, the social milieu, and internal somatic 
and psychological states. All animals with brains have a 
self-system, however rudimentary. Primates, being social 
animals, are focused on social relations that play a major 
role in neuropsychological development. Most of the 
neural activities comprising the self at any given moment 
are unconscious, and some operations are either rarely 
or never conscious. Self-system states normally include 
elements of emotion and perhaps praxis, appropriate to 
the adaptational problem being faced.
 One of the most important functions of the self is 
in observing and modeling itself. As the great perceptual 
psychologist, James J. Gibson (1979; Neisser, 1993) 
showed, self-perception  is a special case of perception 
in general in that one’s being, one’s body, is part of 
the extramental world to which the brain must adapt. 
The cognition of the self is no different in this respect 
than the cognition of any other object. Just how the self 
presents to self-awareness and how one makes sense of 
those presentations are heavily mediated by culture. As 
psychological anthropologist Larry Peters (1994) has 
shown, the “symptoms” of mental illness as interpreted 
by clinicians in a Western technocratic culture may be 
seen as indications of the need for a rite of passage and 
self-transformation in a non-Western context.
Self-reflection, mediated primarily by cortical 
structures in the prefrontal lobes, is probably a 
more advanced facility among humans than any 
other animal on the planet. It is small wonder that 
anthropologists encounter the range of customary self-
construal represented in the ethnographic literature. 
Anthropologists have traditionally emphasized the 
sociocultural factors influencing the development of 
personality, social identity, maturation of social role, 
alterations in consciousness, autobiographical narratives, 
behavior, how people talk about themselves, and so forth. 
More recent studies (e.g., Hollan, 1992; Mageo, 1995; 
Throop, 2000) have more fully recognized the systemic 
and reflexive nature of the self, but none so far have 
grounded the self-system in neurobiology. If one includes 
neurophysiological grounding—if one acknowledges 
that the self is a distinct organization of the brain—it 
becomes obvious that there is always far more to the self-
system than any cognitive model or self-concept, a factor 
rarely acknowledged in most anthropological studies. 
There is also a growing understanding that the self-
system is not necessarily unitary, that sub-systems may 
be in conflict with each other. There may exist recurrent 
contingencies that require a fragmented adaptation 
during the development of the self.
For phenomenological reasons (see Laughlin 
& Throop, 2009), it is easy for people to ignore the 
embodied nature of mind, consciousness, and even the 
self, and to conclude that there exists (to one extent 
or another) an ontological distinction between mind 
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(psyche, self, soul, etc.) and the physical body. In other 
words, local cultural epistemologies are hampered by 
the very structure and operations of the nervous system 
in reaching a complete identity theory of mind-body 
relations, or in understanding the full complexity of the 
self-system. Being cognizant that the self-system is vastly 
complex, most of its operations remaining unconscious to 
actors, allows one to realize that the self is transcendental 
relative to any possible knowledge one may accrue about 
it. It is also clear that there exists no cultural tradition 
that fully models the self-system in anything like the 
complexity of modern neuroscience. Simply put, the 
human nervous system is the most complex system in 
the known universe, and there is no end to what one may 
come to know about its operations, most of which are 
amenable only to scientific scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, there so far exists no widely 
accepted anthropological theory that can accommodate 
a transpersonal, transcultural, or archetypal view of the 
self (cf. Daniels, 2002, for a summary of theories in 
transpersonal psychology). For various reasons too arcane 
to go into here, psychological anthropology has historically 
been heavily influenced by Freudian psychoanalysis 
while virtually ignoring Jungian psychology (Laughlin 
& Tiberia, 2012). Were anthropologists more aware of 
Jungian complex, or analytical psychology (Jung, 1968a, p. 
40 [CW 9 pt. 1 para. 84]), they would know that over a 
century ago Jung taught that the psyche is a vast system 
of subsystems and sub-subsystems, termed complexes, 
most of which remain unconscious to the person (Jung, 
1973b, p. 599 [CW 2 para. 1351]), and which are redolent 
with emotional associations (Jung, 1973a, p. 321 [CW 2 
para. 733]).
The self is merely a term that designates the whole 
personality. The whole personality of man is 
indescribable. His consciousness can be described, 
his unconscious cannot be described because the 
unconscious—and here I must repeat myself—is 
always unconscious. It is really unconscious, we really 
don’t know it, so we don’t know our unconscious 
personality. We have hints, we have certain ideas, 
but we don’t know it really.  . . . The unconscious of 
man can go God knows where. There we are going 
to make discoveries. (Jung, as cited in McGuire & 
Hull, 1977, p. 301)
 
 Jung’s view was that the empirical ego is but 
one complex out of a multitude, and it is entirely possible 
for the self to develop more than one ego-complex. 
Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton (1971, 1999) came close 
to the Jungian view when he described what he called 
protean man, a self-system with more than one ego-
complex, each complex being adaptive in a specific 
set of circumstances. This type of fragmentation is 
characteristic of selves that develop under stressful 
conditions such as poverty, social conflict, domestic and 
social violence, and so forth. Protean development is a 
significant hindrance to the natural tendency of the self 
toward totality or wholeness.
The empirical (i.e., the phenomenologically 
accessible) “hints” about the nature of the unconscious 
are derived from intuitive ideas, images, unintended 
actions, and so forth that may be the objects of self-
reflection. One may learn something of one’s unconscious 
self via dreams, visions, free associations, mythopoeic 
creativity, and other alternative states of consciousness. 
The unconscious is composed of endless archetypal 
structures which, although never observed directly, 
may be known to some extent from watching their 
operations (Laughlin & Tiberia, 2012; Stevens, 1982). 
For neuroanthropological purposes, the terms neural 
network and archetype may be treated as synonymous 
when and if the neural network mediates part of the 
personality. Everyone is born with a self-system, with an 
archetypal self.
The Transcendental Self
Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas (“Fortunate 
is he, who is able to know the causes of things.”) 
Virgil (29 BC, The Georgics, Book II, verse 490)
You cannot step into the same river twice, for fresh 
waters are ever flowing in upon you. Heraclitus 
(lines 41-42, as cited in Burnet (1930), Early Greek 
Philosophy)
One of the most important attributes of self-reflection is that its operations may, under the 
requisite conditions, change one’s self-construal, and 
thus potentially change the organization of the self. 
This process is what Harris L. Friedman (2013; Pappas 
& Friedman, 2012) has called self-expansiveness, the 
transformation of the self-concept as a direct consequence 
of transpersonal experiences and explorations. This 
is a very useful concept for anthropology, as well as 
psychology, for it points to an attribute of spiritual 
development common in polyphasic cultures in which 
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transpersonal experiences are evoked using ritual and 
psychoactive drugs. Again, the concept underscores 
the phenomenological fact that there is no little “me” 
floating around above the self, objectively watching what 
is happening. Self-reflection is a thoroughly subjective 
process by which the self-system monitors its own 
operations. 
 It is crucial to understand that, just as the 
self and world are transcendental relative to one’s 
knowledge, so too is the physical body. One never 
experiences one’s body as it really is. The extramental 
body is vastly complex. Yet one can be aware of the body 
only through exteroceptive (vision hearing, touch, etc.) 
and interoceptive sensations (pain, bliss, proprioception, 
etc.) and the self-model and self-image one informs from 
those sensations. The cognized body is a model of the 
real thing, and is constructed by neural networks that are 
“wired-in”—modeled by what Kinsbourne (1998) has 
called a “body-scheme-acquisition device” (p. 215) and 
a “body-image-acquisition device” (p. 216). Obviously, 
culture can impact this modeling process by varying 
the experiences one has of the body. For instance, an 
advanced practitioner of hatha yoga may develop a 
different model of their body than non-practitioners.
Anthropologist Paul Radin (1927) suggested 
decades ago that in any given society, one would find 
a handful of critical thinkers, or philosophers, while 
everyone else simply accepted their cultural worldview 
as received—Radin called these men of action. It may 
well be, then, that most people in any culture will tend 
to project their self-concept and self-image onto their 
transcendental self, thereby mistaking, as Jung (1969, 
pp. 269-270 [CW 8 para. 516]) noted, the concept 
or image for the object. Belief in a permanent me is a 
matter of self-deceptive attitude, which is instilled in 
childhood (Hood, 2012) and altered by culture, and 
potentially by experience. It seems likely that societies 
range along a continuum from those that discourage too 
much self-reflection to those that positively sanction, or 
even mandate more advanced self-reflection. The point 
is, from an empirical view, all that is required to realize 
the impermanence and illusion of the self-concept, or 
any mental function with which the self is identified, is a 
sufficient level of self-reflection (often during the course 
of meditation). In a sense, the human brain is wired to 
potentially realize itself as it really is—that virtually all 
psychological functions of the brain are impermanent 
(Austin, 1999; Flanagan, 2011).
The Relevance of No-Self
There is no better example of the transformational 
capacity of self-reflection than the realization of no-self, 
that is, the realization that there is no such thing as 
a permanent ego. The belief in a permanent ego is an 
artifact of cultural conditioning and is easily dispelled 
by self-reflection as long as the individual does not overly 
identify with his or her self-model. It is safe to say that 
any cultural tradition that encourages self-reflection as a 
path to self-knowledge and wisdom will lead inevitably 
to “seeing” that the self is dynamic and that nothing that 
arises in consciousness is permanent. This is not a matter 
of taste, but of seeing the self as it really is—indeed, as a 
transcendental self-system as described above.
 The most famous tradition of self-reflection 
leading to this realization, and the elevation of that 
realization to a cornerstone of philosophy, is the Buddhist 
doctrine of anatta (no-self, selflessness; see Austin, 1999; 
Carlisle, 2006; Collins, 1982; Federman, 2011; Flanagan, 
2011, pp. 93-98; Harvey, 1995; Metzinger, 2009; 
Morris, 1994; Smith, 2010). In Theravada Buddhism, 
the realization of anatta is automatic on the path to 
awakening. In a famous treatise on insight meditation, 
the great Burmese meditation master, Mahāsi Sayādaw 
(1994), noted that the belief in a permanent ego falls 
away during stage four of a 19 stage maturation process 
leading to the realization of Nibbāna and the fruits of 
that realization. What the discourse obviously implies is 
that personal identification with a fixed and permanent 
self-model is common to all people everywhere, even 
in Buddhist societies. This is a point that ethnographer 
Melford Spiro (1993) made about his Burmese Buddhist 
informants. When he went into the field among Burmese 
Buddhists, and aware of the central teaching of anatta, 
he wished to see how that teaching of no-self (no-soul) 
influenced peoples’ self-understanding:
After a few months into my field work, however, 
it became apparent that I would have to change 
my research plans because I discovered that the 
Burmese villagers with whom I lived and worked 
do not internalize the doctrine of anatta. Instead, 
they strongly believe in the very ego or soul that 
this doctrine denies. They do so on two accounts, 
experiential and pragmatic. First, because they 
themselves experience a subjective sense of a self, the 
culturally normative concept of an ego-less person 
does not correspond to their personal experience. 
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Second, and perhaps more important, they find the 
doctrine of selfless person not congenial to their 
soteriological aspirations. (p. 119)
Spiro’s findings among the Burmese mirror my own 
among Tibetan Buddhist monks. The realization of no-
self is exceptional in any society, even those whose local 
epistemology or ethnopsychology describe the emptiness 
of the transcendental self. Tibetan Buddhist monks may 
learn texts by heart that extol the virtues of realizing no-
self (the anatman), few actually practice the advanced 
meditations leading to this realization.
Practitioners of Western philosophical and 
spiritual traditions have reached the same conclusion based 
upon meditations focusing upon the empirical contents 
of the “empirical” ego. The great phenomenologist, 
Edmund Husserl (1989, pp. 103-104), concluded from his 
introspection that the ego is essentially empty of content 
and is really no more than an enduring point of view 
upon ever-changing content. The ego is an ineluctable 
focus of intentionality toward the world of experience 
(Husserl, 1969, p. 23). A meditator inevitably comes to 
this conclusion because he or she finds that every content 
she focuses upon as me—as self—is impermanent; that 
is, all contents arise and pass away within the sphere of 
consciousness, hence, the “you can’t step in the same 
river twice” metaphor above. All that remains of my self 
is an enduring point of view always present within the 
stream of consciousness, a point of view that is devoid of 
content, and yet is identical to the unity of each moment 
of consciousness (Husserl, 1970, p. 545).
Meditation and the Transcendental Self
Meditation is essentially the disciplined turning 
of the spotlight of consciousness upon the internal 
processes of the transcendental self. It is clear now from 
research on the neuropsychology of meditation that the 
process is one of reorganization of the self (Damasio, 
2003, 2010; Deshmukh, 2006; Varela & Shear, 1999; 
Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). A self-aware self is 
different both experientially and structurally than a non-
aware self. Indeed, awareness of self is mediated differently 
than awareness of the other (Decety & Sommerville, 
2003). The introspective mind-state is mediated by 
a discrete organization in the brain (Heatherton et 
al., 2006), and as that system of networks develops 
through disciplined application of self-awareness, it 
grows and reorganizes (Goldberg, Harel, & Malach, 
2006; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; 
Murphy & Donovan, 1999). As more is learned about 
how the brain mediates its own self-reflection, there is a 
concomitant and growing realization among researchers 
of the value of introspective, phenomenological, and 
meditative research in science (Tart, 2001; Wallace, 
2007, 2009). 
Conclusion
Approaching the nature and experience of the self from a transpersonal neuroanthropological perspective 
will help both transpersonal and ethnological researchers 
avoid some of the pitfalls of more constructivist views of 
social identity. More specifically, combining ethnographic 
fieldwork with neuropsychological research underscores 
the systematic nature of the self. Traditional cultures 
exhibit myriad ways of conceiving, conceptualizing, 
imaging, and talking about the self (Wexler, 2006). 
These ways of knowing are usually focused upon the 
socially active person and emphasize the ways that 
societies have of encouraging self-identity (or culturally 
conditioned model of the self). From an ecological 
point of view (Gibson, 1979; Neisser, 1993), one can 
best understand that self-construal is an adaptational 
process no different than adaptation to other aspects 
of extramental reality. Enduring social relations require 
that there be a consensus, habitual and customary 
understanding of the social person, and each individual 
must more or less conform to social expectations in order 
to, so to speak, “go along to get along.” 
 But many cultures also recognize that such self-
models are incomplete and transitory, at least implicitly 
reflecting the mysterious and transcendental reality of 
the true self. By realizing that most of what the brain 
does occurs unconsciously, including processes integral 
to the psyche and self, the researcher cannot fall into 
the error of mistaking the self-concept for the true 
self. Moreover, understanding that neurophysiological 
systems mediating the self both develop over the course 
of the life span and are to some extent plastic in their 
organization, forces the researcher’s perspective into a 
broader and more dynamic standpoint.
 It is reasonable to posit that the more pressure 
there is in a society for people to conform to a fixed 
and shared concept of the social (economic, political) 
self, the less the culture will recognize and encourage 
transpersonal explorations. On the other hand, one 
of the tipoffs that a society does encourage such 
explorations is that they will apply rituals to that end: 
for example, the Sun Dance among Native Americans, 
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ritualized meditations among Buddhist practitioners, 
the ritualized ingestion of psychoactive substances (or 
entheogens) among shamanic cultures, the Sema dance 
among Sufis, and so forth. The point of all such ritual 
practices is to set the stage for mind-states requisite to 
transcending ego-consciousness and self-identity and 
to accessing the depths of the true self (Csordas, 1994; 
Turner, 1969). The ethnographic literature is rich with 
examples of transpersonal spiritual traditions that, 
as with modern anthropology and neuropsychology, 
acknowledge the transcendental nature of the self.
 Finally, in terms of the evolution of the self, it 
is interesting that most of the higher processes of self 
and self-construal involve the most recent part of the 
cerebral cortex, namely the prefrontal lobes. This crucial 
neurophysiological factor should be more important to 
anthropology than it heretofore has been (Goldberg, 2009; 
Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin et al., 1990). For instance, it is 
the frontal executive functions that have made the social 
distribution of intelligence and complexity typical of our 
species possible (Huberman, 1995). What is intriguing 
here is that it is this same advanced cortical system of 
cognitive imagining and emotion-modulating processes 
that produces the kind of complex self-construal typical 
of most people in all societies, and that also facilitates 
advanced self-awareness and dynamic self-models 
informing transpersonal phenomenological disciplines. 
The prefrontal lobes make the distinctly human cultural-
self possible, as well as the self-actualizing mind-states of 
the few, if any, who transcend cultural models of the self 
in any society.
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Note
1.      Ethnological and ethnographic interest in the self has 
burgeoned over the last three decades (e.g., Battaglia, 
1995; Ben-Āmôs & Weissberg, 1999; Cohen, 1994; 
Erchak, 1992; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Hollan, 1992; 
Lindholm, 2007; Mageo, 1995, 2002a, 2003; 
Morris, 1994; Sökefeld, 1999; Stromberg, 1985; 
Throop, 2000; Van Wolputte, 2004; Whittaker, 
1992). The focus of this literature has been on the 
many ways that cultures construe the self, including 
identity, ego, the “I” and the “me,” personhood, and 
the like.
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